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ABSTRACT 
CATRINA CURTIS: Super PACs: Where They Came from and What We Know About 
Dark Money Seven Years Later 
(Under the direction of Marvin King) 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore Super PACs as a source of campaign finance and 
their impact on the federal elections process. After explaining the history of federal 
campaign finance law in the United States, the role of anonymity by Super PACs is 
questioned. This thesis argues that two court case decisions are responsible for the 
creation of Super PACs: Citizens United v. FEC and SpeechNOW.org v. FEC. The cases, 
and their conflicting interests, are both summarized and analyzed. Next, using federal 
campaign finance data from the past decade, the impact of Super PACs on campaign 
finance is both described and analyzed. These data are used to draw conclusions about 
the immense impact the dark money produced by Super PACs has had on recent election 
cycles and on the modern era of campaign finance. The struggle between anonymous big 
money donations and democracy is discussed. It is concluded that Super PACs are 
incompatible with an open and equal democracy, as they allow unlimited, anonymous 
donations to overpower the interests of individuals.  
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CHAPTER I- Why Super PACs? 
 
 The term “Super PAC” was officially coined by National Journal reporter Eliza 
Newlin Carney on June 26, 2010. Carney wanted to create a shorter expression for the 
“independent expenditure-only political action committees” she thought she would 
increasingly be writing about in what she described as a “post-Citizens United world” 
(Levinthal et al. 2012). Carney was undoubtedly correct that these independent 
expenditure-only political action committees would become incredibly popular. In the 
federal election cycles since 2010, Super PACs have been responsible for $4,214,707,961 
(“Political Action Committees” 2018) in campaign contributions. Such a large amount of 
money in contributions has clearly had an effect on federal campaigns and elections. 
Furthermore, no one knows where exactly all of these massive amounts of money 
originate from. Super PACs give donors the opportunity to contribute through 
incorporated entities which do not have to disclose their donors. Both the anonymity of 
donors and unlimited ceiling on funds of Super PACs have made them a crucial 
component of today’s elections.1 
                                               
1 Super PACs only specifically affect campaigns for candidates for federal positions. This is because they 
were made legal through court decisions which all dealt with the FEC (Federal Elections Commission), 
which only regulates federal campaigns. Therefore, all campaigns and campaign finance rules discussed in 
this paper will deal specifically with campaigns for candidates running for federal positions, not state or 
local. 
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Early Campaign Finance Law 
 
 Campaign finance law in American elections can be traced all the way back to the 
days of George Washington himself. After losing an election for the Virginia House of 
Burgesses in 1755, two years later Washington purchased $195 worth of punch and hard 
cider for friends and won. The legislature subsequently passed a law prohibiting 
“candidates or any persons on their behalf" from giving voters "money, meat, drink, 
entertainment or provision or … any present, gift, reward or entertainment etc. in order to 
be elected” (Fuller, 2014). Congress itself passed its first law regulating campaign 
finance in 1867 through a naval appropriations bill which prohibited government officials 
from soliciting naval yard workers for money. Similarly, in 1883, the Pendleton Civil 
Service Act prohibited government officials from soliciting donations from any civil 
service workers.  
The presidential election of 1904 brought campaign finance law and reform to 
national attention as it became a major component of President Theodore Roosevelt’s 
campaign. After fellow Republican William McKinley won the 1896 election after 
raising $16 million and running a pro-business administration in favor of his donors, 
Roosevelt promised “to protect the integrity of the elections of its own officials [as] 
inherent” in government and called for “vigorous measures to eradicate” political 
corruption, as he noted there was “no enemy of free government more dangerous and 
none so insidious.” He also suggested that all contributions by corporations for any 
political purposes to be made illegal (Fuller, 2014). In 1907, Roosevelt’s wishes were 
legitimized with the passage of the Tillman Act, which made corporate contributions to 
federal candidates illegal but did not provide much in terms of enforcement. Through a 
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process of the passage of bills and Supreme Court cases deciding the legitimacy of those 
bills in the early 1900s, congressional candidates were required to report their finances 
and all contributions over $100 on a quarterly basis. However, donors would set up 
multiple committees in order to donate different amounts all less than $100 and bypass 
any reporting measures. 
 With the passage of the 17th Amendment in 1913, which provided for the direct 
election of senators, more federal elections meant more campaign money that needed to 
be regulated. In 1943, the Smith-Connelly Act prohibited unions from donating to federal 
candidates, as banks and corporations already were prohibited from doing. In 1947, the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act banned corporations and unions from even making 
independent expenditure contributions in federal elections. “As long as candidates 
promised not to use their primary money during the general election campaign or collect 
private donations, they could campaign with publicly funded dollars” (Fuller, 2014). A 
major shift in federal campaign finance laws occurred in 1967, when, after nearly 50 
years, Congress finally collected campaign finance reports. The modern era of campaign 
finance law had begun.   
 
Modern History of Campaign Finance Law: Super PACs 
 
Campaign finance law consistently evolves in modern America due to new 
legislation and landmark court cases. One of the most recent court cases which set a 
precedent in campaign finance laws by allowing and establishing the concept of Super 
PACs is SpeechNow.org v. FEC, decided on March 26, 2010 by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals. SpeechNOW is an unincorporated nonprofit organization which functions to 
make independent expenditures to openly advocate for or oppose candidates in federal 
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elections. SpeechNOW only accepts contributions from individuals and not corporations 
or unions. However, due to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), if it spent or 
raised more than $1,000 in a calendar year, SpeechNOW was limited in its contributions, 
must register as a political action committee, and must report all contributions as a 
registered PAC. On February 14, 2008, SpeechNOW officially filed a complaint to the 
D.C. District Court arguing that the conditions placed upon them as a political committee 
due to the FECA were unconstitutional. They said that the FECA restricts their First 
Amendment right to associate and limits individuals’ freedom of speech by requiring 
them to register and limiting how much money they can contribute. Furthermore, 
SpeechNOW argued that the required reporting of a PAC was unconstitutionally 
burdensome (“Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission” 2018).  
The Court ruled that “the contribution limits of 2 U.S.C. §441a are 
unconstitutional as applied to individuals’ contributions to SpeechNOW. The court also 
ruled that the reporting requirements of 2 U.S.C. §§432, 433 and 434(a) and the 
organizational requirements of 2 U.S.C. §431(4) and §431(8) can be constitutionally 
applied to SpeechNOW” (“Ongoing Litigation” 2018). The most important and 
precedent-setting part of this decision was the ruling that limits on political contributions 
violate the First Amendment when the government has no anti-corruption interest in 
limiting contributions. However, this distinction is limited to contributions to a group that 
only makes independent expenditures, such as SpeechNow.org, and does not apply to 
direct contributions to a political candidate.2 Ultimately, the Super PAC was born, an 
                                               
2 Independent expenditures are defined by the FEC as “an expenditure for a campaign that: expressly 
advocates the election or defeat or a clearly identified federal candidate; and is not coordinated with a 
candidate, candidates’ committee, party committee, or their agents.” Furthermore, under FEC law, 
independent expenditures made by political committees “are not contributions and are not subject to 
contribution limits” (“Independent Expenditures”, 2018). 
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independent expenditure-only political action committee that may accept unlimited 
donations from individuals, corporations, and trade unions. 
Two months prior, on January 21, 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in Citizens 
United v. FEC (Federal Elections Commission) and helped pave the way for the 
SpeechNOW decision. Citizens United, a conservative nonprofit organization, had 
planned to run commercials for its film Hillary: The Movie and to provide it for free for 
Americans on video on demand (“Citizens United v. FEC (Supreme Court)”, 2018). 
However, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 restricts what are known as 
“electioneering communications” in order to control big money contributions,3 and thus 
prevents corporations and labor unions from funding them from their general treasuries. 
It also requires the disclosure of donors to such electioneering communications and 
requires a disclaimer if the communication is not authorized by the political candidate. 
These restrictions would prevent Citizens United from their plans of releasing the film 
during an election cycle, so Citizens United filed an injunction against the FEC to prevent 
the BCRA from applying to Hillary: The Movie.  
The District of Columbia Circuit Court denied the injunction on grounds that 
prohibiting corporations and labor unions from contributing to electioneering 
communications from their general treasury was already deemed constitutional in 
McConnell v. FEC, and that the film was “express advocacy” and therefore the other 
restrictions did not apply. Soon after, however, the Supreme Court noted probable 
jurisdiction in the case, and ruled 5-4 in favor of Citizens United. In a repeal of parts of 
                                               
3 Colloquially, “big money contributions” are defined as any donation over $200, which is the minimum 
donation amount that must be reported to the FEC. However, when candidates claim to be supported by 
small donations and not by big money, they may be alluding to the idea of not taking contributions in the 
surplus of thousands of dollars, or not taking contributions from large, big money, corporations.  
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both Austin v. Chamber of Commerce4 and McConnell v. FEC., the Supreme Court ruled 
that “under the First Amendment corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in 
candidate elections cannot be limited” (“Citizens United v. FEC (Supreme Court)”, 
2018). The majority opinion further explained that prohibiting corporate independent 
expenditures and electioneering communications is a prohibition on free political speech. 
Unlike the Circuit Court, the Supreme Court ruled that the FEC’s electioneering 
communications rules did apply to Hillary: The Movie and its advertisements, but that 
these disclaimer and disclosure guidelines did not burden any ability to free speech.  
The rulings in SpeechNow.org v. FEC and Citizens United v. FEC together 
forbade any ceiling on election contributions for either independent expenditure only 
committees or electioneering communications. In order to understand the full weight of 
these decisions’ impacts on campaign finance law, it is important to understand the 
Federal Elections Campaign Act itself, which was partially repealed and challenged 
through these rulings.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations in the state from using their own treasury 
money for independent expenditures either opposing or supporting a candidate for state office. However, 
by setting up an independent fund solely for political purposes, a corporation could make independent 
expenditure donations. Because they wanted to use general funds to support a candidate for Michigan’s 
House of Representatives, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce opposed the act on the grounds that it was 
not a corporation and that the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. On March 27, 1990, the Supreme Court upheld the Michigan Campaign Finance Act. The 
majority opinion states the act was “narrowly crafted and implemented to achieve the important goal of 
maintaining integrity in the political process.” Furthermore, it stated that the Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce was more like a business than a nonprofit organization given its activities, connections to 
business leaders, and large number of business corporation members (“Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce”, 2019).  
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Federal Elections Campaign Act 
 
Adopted in 1971, the FECA was created to regulate both the raising and spending 
of money in all United States federal elections. The FEC (Federal Elections 
Commission), the independent regulatory agency charged with governing federal 
campaign finance law, was not created until 1974 as an amendment to the FECA 
following Watergate5 in a stronger attempt to keep corruption out of federal campaigns 
and elections. The FECA created limitations on the amount of contributions that could be 
made to political candidates and their parties and mandated the disclosure of all 
contributions and expenditures in federal campaigns. Lastly, it completely prohibited 
corporate and union contributions, speech, and expenditures. Prior to SpeechNow and 
Citizens United, the FECA was significantly amended several times regarding 
contribution limits and donor disclosure requirements (“Legislation” 2018). 
In January 1975, a coalition of plaintiffs, including Senator James Buckley of 
New York, alleged in District Court that the FECA’s contribution limits violated freedom 
of speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment. The District of Columbia District Court 
upheld the FECA, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. On January 30, 1976, 
the Supreme Court decided in Buckley v. Valeo that some of the contribution and 
expenditure limits of the amended FECA were unconstitutional. This case set a precedent 
by declaring that money raised or spent for a particular political candidate is a form of 
free speech and protected by the Constitution. Furthermore, it declared the importance of 
money in the modern federal campaigns which relied heavily on mass media. “Virtually 
                                               
5 Although President Nixon signed into law some reforms to the FECA in 1972, his Watergate scandal 
included Nixon’s reelection committee funneling illegal corporate contributions into slush funds in order to 
pay for the infamous break-ins and to pay cash for other favors. After the Watergate hearings, the public 
was eager to see campaign finance further reformed which led to the 1974 amendments and creation of the 
FEC (“The Washington Post”, 2018). 
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every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of 
money…The electorate’s increasing dependence on television, radio and other mass 
media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication 
indispensable instruments of effective political speech” (Jones 2015). Specifically, 
Buckley v. Valeo struck down limits on campaign expenditures, limits on independent 
spending, and limits on expenditures of candidates’ personal funds. However, it did 
uphold the FECA’s limits on contributions, as the Supreme Court explained that the 
contributor was still free to spend independently and associate with political candidates in 
other ways.  
 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
 
Historically, pressure to create and enforce campaign finance laws has come from 
multiple areas both within and out of government. In 1989, the infamous Keating Five 
Scandal created more pressure which amounted to another significant change to 
campaign finance law. Charles H. Keating, Jr., banker and Chairman of the Lincoln 
Savings and Loan Association came under scrutiny when his bank faced an intensive, 
beyond regulatory investigation by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The bank 
collapsed in 1989, causing a $3 billion loss to the federal government as well as wipeout 
losses to 23,000 plus bondholders and investors of the bank. When it was revealed that 
Mr. Keating had made more than $1.3 million in campaign contributions to five U.S. 
senators, the Senate Ethics Committee began an investigation alleging those donations 
amounted to unethical pressure on the Federal Home Loan Bank Board on behalf of the 
Lincoln Savings and Loan Association. Five senators, California Democrat Alan 
Cranston, Arizona Democrat Dennis DeConcini, Ohio Democrat John Glenn, Arizona 
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Republican John McCain, and Michigan Democrat Donald W. Riegle, Jr., were all 
accused. Only three senators, Cranston, DeConcini, and Riegle, were found guilty of 
unethically interfering with the government to cause the Lincoln Savings and Loan 
Association to close before it imploded at a loss worse than it did. This scandal became 
known as the Keating Five, and although all senators implicated went on to continue their 
terms and some even continued long political careers, it became a symbol of corruption 
in the federal government and in campaign contributions (“What Was the Keating 
Five?” 2018). In particular, senator John McCain, although not formally found guilty, 
worked hard to remove what he called “my asterisk” on his political career by going on to 
create stricter campaign finance legislation (Nowicki, Dan, and Bill Muller 2018). 
McCain’s biggest reform effort, another major change to the FECA, came in 2002 
through the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, better known as BCRA or the McCain-
Feingold Act. Although the FECA restricted campaign contributions for federal 
candidates, state campaign finance laws differed by allowing large and often unlimited 
contributions by both corporations and unions. These contributions, known as soft 
money,6 were often funneled to federal candidates or political parties, bypassing the rules 
and regulations of the FECA. The BCRA was created in an attempt to close these 
loopholes and ban so called soft money. Passed by Congress on March 27, 2002, the 
BCRA raised the limit on contributions by individuals and banned federal candidates or 
their parties from soliciting, receiving, or directing money from any person or 
organization not following the FECA guidelines. The BCRA also prohibited the use of 
                                               
6 “Soft money” is money donated to political parties that is not regulated by the FEC. This money comes 
from corporations, unions, and individuals who can donate an unlimited amount of money, because their 
donations are made in support of the entire party rather than of a specific candidate, thus not justifying 
campaign finance laws. “Hard money”, on the other hand, is money that is donated to candidates that is 
regulated by the FEC because it is donations made specifically to support certain candidates.  
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electioneering communications by corporations or trade unions, which was later 
overruled in Citizens United v. FEC (Jones 2018). Two of the principal restrictions of the 
BCRA, controlling and limiting soft money and regulating electioneering 
communications, were upheld by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC on December 
10, 2003 (“McConnell” 2018). 
 
Introduction of Super PACs: Size and Donor Anonymity  
 
The evolution of campaign finance laws in modern America is evident in the 
court case decisions, both upper and lower, and the federal legislation that guides it. 
These changes have had major effects on how federal campaigns are funded and 
conducted and have thus arguably had effects on the results of federal elections. One of 
the most recent major changes to how campaigns can be funded is the birth and 
introduction of the Super PAC, an unlimited independent expenditure only political 
action committee. Super PACs have the ability to raise an unlimited amount of funds 
from undisclosed donors in order to support political candidates and campaigns in certain 
regulated ways, as long as they have no direct contact with the candidate themselves. The 
size and anonymity of Super PACs have made them a powerful force in recent federal 
election campaigns and are thus an important component to analyze when studying 
campaign finance laws and their effects on elections.  
In the first federal election campaign cycle in which Super PACs were permitted, 
2012, Super PAC contributions made up 47.13% of total outside spending or independent 
expenditures. In the most recent completed cycle, 2016, Super PAC spending made up 
62.51% of outside spending. This represents a significant increase in outside expenditures 
due to the introduced legality of Super PACs, as in the 2010 cycle, Super PAC spending 
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made up 0% of outside spending in federal campaigns (“Expenditures” 2018). To go 
from having no part in the campaign process, before the SpeechNow v. FEC decision, to 
amounting to more than half of its total independent expenditures, it is clear that Super 
PACs have had an increased influence on federal campaigns. Because Super PAC 
contributions and spending are unlimited, their size and relevance is only likely to 
continue to grow. 
Even more so than making up a greater percentage of outside spending, Super 
PACs have greatly increased the overall amount of outside spending in federal elections. 
Between 2010 and 2012 alone, the first cycle which allowed for Super PAC spending, 
total independent expenditures increased by 20.5%, from just over $200 million in 2010 
to over $1 billion in 2012. Total outside spending had been increasing steadily before, 
with the exception of more always being spent in presidential election years than the 
cycle following, but the introduction of Super PACs caused an unprecedented increase in 
independent expenditures. As independent expenditures amounted to just over $5 million 
in 1990 but have amounted to over $1 billion each federal election cycle since the legality 
of Super PACs (except 2014), it is evident the immense change Super PACs have had on 
election spending (“Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle…”, 2018). These 
unparalleled increases in outside spending also emphasize the size of Super PACs 
themselves. In order to have such an impact on the increase of overall independent 
expenditures, Super PACs must be big enough in and of themselves.  
Beyond the size of Super PACs, the aspect of their anonymity also makes them a 
major influence in federal election campaigns. Super PACs must report their donors, the 
date of the donation, and the amount of the donation to the FEC. However, commonly, 
individual donors make contributions through other organized groups to Super PACs, 
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thus bypassing having their own name disclosed as a donor to the Super PAC. Another 
way donors have found a loophole to remain anonymous in their campaign contributions 
is by their Super PAC waiting until after an election to report their donors. For example, 
the Super PAC Red and Gold spent $1 million in 2018 attacking Representative Martha 
McSally in Arizona. However, they informed the FEC that they would not file their 
monthly reports, which would disclose their donors, until September 20, which was more 
than three weeks after McSally’s Republican primary. While Red and Gold’s donor 
records eventually were released to the public, the names of those donors could not have 
had an effect on voters, as it came after election day. “Overall, at least two dozen super 
PACs that spent millions of dollars in recent elections used loopholes to get out of 
revealing their donors, according to information compiled by the Campaign Legal Center, 
a watchdog organization” (Severns et al. 2018). While loopholes like the late filing by 
Red and Gold are not incredibly common in campaigns, once Super PACs observe others 
participating in them without any repercussions, they will likely follow suit, opening up 
the possibility for more Super PACs bypassing campaign finance laws (Severns et al. 
2018). 
Does Anonymity Matter?  
 
The term “dark money” has often been used to describe spending by political 
nonprofits. Since political nonprofits have no legal obligation to disclose their donors, 
their contributors typically remain anonymous. The anonymity of the donors makes their 
donations what is called dark money, since the public has no knowledge of its source. 
With the introduced legality of the Super PAC, however, dark money can also be used to 
describe some aspects of Super PAC donations. Although Super PACs are required to 
report their donors, donors can contribute through “shell” organizations such as political 
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nonprofits themselves or corporations, therefore making their donations dark money. 
Super PACs are only required to report to the FEC the donors whom have contributed 
$200 or more. However, the name they report can be that of an organization, so the 
individual who contributed more than $200 to that organization, and therefore the Super 
PAC, can essentially avoid the disclosure requirement. In this sense, Super PACs have, 
for the first time in the history of campaign finance laws, made it possible for individuals, 
corporations, and unions to donate an unlimited amount of dark money to a candidate’s 
independent expenditures. 
The debate over whether the identity of donors to political campaigns should 
remain anonymous or should be disclosed to the public finds credence on both sides, 
which are both focused on the potential for corruption. This issue has recently gained 
more attention and debate in the scheme of the long history of the creation and reform of 
campaign finance laws. Supporters of anonymity for donors claim that if politicians did 
not know who financially supported their campaign, they would not try to repay them 
with policy or political favors once they were elected. A major critique of the corruption 
and unethical acts of politicians is that they make decisions once in office that benefit the 
donors who helped them get into office. On the other hand, supporters of transparency for 
donors claim that it holds the elected officials accountable to the electorate, as they are 
able to know exactly which and what kind of people or organizations are funding the 
candidate. The supporters believe this inhibits potential for corruption on behalf of the 
politician, as they will not attempt to use their elected office to benefit their donors if the 
public serves as a watchdog by knowing the identities of the donors.  
 Both supporters and opponents of anonymity for campaign donors often ground 
their arguments in the Constitution. Advocates of anonymity for donors argue that the 
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First Amendment right to join together for political means is inhibited because of 
intimidation when a list of a certain political group’s members is made public. These 
proponents often cite the 1958 Supreme Court decision which kept the names of the 
members of the NAACP anonymous from the state of Alabama. “It is hardly a novel 
perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may 
constitute an effective restraint on freedom of association” (Denniston, 2012). Although 
this decision does not pertain directly to campaign finance law, proponents explain that it 
is still a precedent set by the court which maintains disclosure of names of members of a 
political group inhibits the individuals of that group’s freedom of association. However, 
supporters of disclosure or transparency for campaign contributors claim that the First 
Amendment actually provides for a right for Americans to know who is attempting to 
influence their elections. Anonymity opponents contend this has also been established by 
the Supreme Court. In 2010, the ruling in Doe v. Reed upheld the public disclosure of 
individuals whom had signed a ballot measure initiative. Justice Scalia noted in the 
decision, “Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic 
courage, without which democracy is doomed” (Denniston, 2012). In this argument, a 
democracy cannot ensue without those influencing politics being named publicly.  
Regarding Super PACs specifically, it is evident in the data of independent 
expenditures, both before and after their legality, that the introduction of anonymous 
donors spurred more political involvement. Contributions for outside spending increased 
dramatically with the introduction of Super PACs, signaling that these donors were more 
willing to contribute when their identities could remain anonymous. This supports the 
argument of many proponents of donor anonymity who claim that anonymity protects 
donors whom would otherwise be too intimidated to donate if their donations were 
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forcibly and publicly disclosed. In the absence of disclosure, these donors contribute 
more to political campaigns. Reasons for this could stem from both the donor and the 
candidate themselves. If the donor was wanting to protect his or her own name or 
interests from being associated with a specific political campaign, Super PACs allow 
them to donate and still remain anonymous. If a political candidate is worried about the 
electorate thinking negatively about their campaign due to a certain contributor, the 
campaign may be more encouraged to solicit donations from controversial individuals or 
corporations without concern for public backlash. 
But how do these aspects of anonymity affect a democracy? If a donor is trying to 
protect his or her name or interests from being associated with a political candidate’s, 
what does that say about the legitimacy of that candidate in running for public office? 
And if a candidate wants to keep the public from knowing that a controversial candidate 
or corporation is supporting their campaign, what does that say about the ethics of that 
candidate and about the potential for corruption if they were elected? These questions are 
at the core of the debate over the legal anonymity of donors to Super PACs. They 
represent an intersection between ethics and democracy and increased participation in 
political campaigns. The question ultimately comes down to whether it is reasonable and 
constitutional to sacrifice public knowledge of contributors in order to retain donor 
privacy and increased political involvement. Does the anonymity or public transparency 
of political campaign donors actually matter to a democracy? 
  
Independent Expenditures 
  
 Super PACS act as independent expenditure only political action committees, 
meaning that they are only allowed to participate in independent expenditures as they 
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relate to federal candidates and campaigns. In order to understand the purpose of Super 
PACs and how they function, it is essential to understand exactly what constitutes an 
independent expenditure. According to the FEC’s legislation, independent expenditures 
are defined as “an expenditure for a campaign that: expressly advocates the election or 
defeat or a clearly identified federal candidate; and is not coordinated with a candidate, 
candidates’ committee, party committee, or their agents” (“Independent Expenditures”, 
2018). Therefore, the type of actions Super PACs may partake in in campaigns is highly 
regulated. The most important and limiting aspect of this regulation is that Super PACs 
can have no coordination with a candidate, their campaign team, or their political party. 
This is one major way Super PACs are set apart from other forms of political action 
committees and sources of campaign finance. Super PACs act solely on their own and are 
therefore not explicitly an asset to a certain candidate. They have the liberty to choose 
whichever candidates they want to support or oppose in any given election but owe no 
certain amount of money or loyalty to those candidates as they are prohibited from any 
formal communication with them or their teams.  
 The reason Super PACs are unlimited in terms of money spent on independent 
expenditures is because they are prohibited from coordinating with the candidates and 
their campaign teams. This restriction on communication is what prompted the Supreme 
Court to rule that independent expenditures hold no possibility for corruption and 
therefore should not be limited in terms of what they can spend (“Ongoing Litigation”, 
2018). Because they cannot communicate directly with the official campaign, they are not 
seen as an actual part of the campaign. Therefore, no corruption can inevitably take place, 
as the Super PAC cannot corrupt a campaign in which it plays no official part. However, 
Super PACs are required to disclose the name of their organization on any independent 
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expenditure they fund. In the legal terms of the FECA, “a communication representing an 
independent expenditure must display a disclaimer notice” (“Understanding Independent 
Expenditures”, 2018). This opens the opportunity for Super PACs to participate in 
independent expenditures, or what is often referred to as open spending for a candidate, 
in an unlimited form.  
 Independent expenditures by Super PACs are made in a variety of ways, but the 
most common are TV advertisements, radio advertisements, and direct mailing. Without 
any coordination with the actual campaign, a Super PAC may air a TV commercial either 
endorsing or attacking a certain candidate in an election. The candidate and his or her 
campaign team would not even know that the ad was being aired, let alone the content of 
that ad, until they actually saw it for themselves on TV. This can stir controversy between 
a candidate and his or her campaign team and the Super PAC. Even if a Super PAC aired 
a TV commercial supporting a candidate, it may not follow the media strategy the 
candidate’s team had planned and approved for themselves. However, because of the 
communication restriction between the Super PAC and the candidate, there is no way for 
them to communicate this to the Super PAC and approve it before it airs or ask for it to 
be taken down or edited. 
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CHAPTER II- CITIZENS UNITED V FEC 
 As previously explained, the Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United v Federal 
Election Commission on January 21, 2010 paved the way for the formation of Super 
PACs. By ruling that unlimited corporate independent expenditures and electioneering 
communications are constitutional as a form of freedom of speech, the Court’s decision 
legalized an integral aspect of Super PACs. The case was brought before the Supreme 
Court by Citizens United, a nonprofit organization, which had planned to run 
commercials for its film Hillary: The Movie and provide it for all viewers on video on 
demand. However, according to §441b of the FECA7, this would be a felony on behalf of 
Citizens United for funding electioneering communications from a corporate treasury 
within 30 days of a federal election. Citizens United questioned the constitutionality of 
this law, claiming it diminishes their First Amendment right to freedom of speech as a 
group. Ultimately, the case became a question over whether the decisions made by the 
Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and McConnell v. FEC were still 
valid and should be applied to Citizens United. In fact, after the original trial, the Court 
moved the decision back to the next term and asked both the plaintiff and defendant to 
file briefs specifically arguing for or against Austin and McConnell based on the current 
                                               
7 §441b of the FECA states that it is unlawful for corporations to make contributions or expenditures to any 
political candidate or campaign.  
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case. These briefs, and the questioning of Austin itself, are the most important for 
understanding what led to the creation of Super PACs.  
 
Argument of the Plaintiff 
 
 Citizens United argued that both the decisions in McConnell v. FEC and Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce must be overruled in order to fully protect the First 
Amendment and their position in the case. They focus their argument on the repeal of 
Austin, as they state that the McConnell decision would never have been made without 
the precedent of Austin. “Austin was wrong when it was decided, and this Court’s 
subsequent decisions have further undermined its First Amendment analysis,” (558 U.S. 
310). While Citizens United argued for the repeal of Austin in order to have the current 
case ruled in their favor, they made it clear that this was not simply about victory for 
themselves. They claimed that all current framework for regulating corporations’ political 
speech is invalid because it is based on Austin.  
 Citizens United disputes the ruling in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
by regarding its rationale as flawed. The Court ruled in Austin that corporation’s 
“immense aggregations of wealth” potentially held a “corrosive and distorting effect” on 
politics and elections. Citizens United claims that this reasoning means that some 
speakers’ political speech must be suppressed if it were to have the same “effect” 
considered distorting by the Court. However, they explain that the government has no 
interest in equalizing political voices. Furthermore, Citizens United argues that the 
Constitution does not specifically give fewer rights to corporations than to individuals 
and that “shareholders do not need the protection against using corporation funds to pay 
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for political messages because ‘corporate democracy’ affords sufficient protection,” (558 
U.S. 310). Citizens United also addresses the idea that the Court should respect the 
precedent set by Austin under the theory of stare decisis8 but argues that many justices 
have already criticized the decision and argued for its overruling, diminishing any sound 
reliance on the precedent.  
 Later, in a brief filed as a response to the FEC, Citizens United argued that the 
government was forsaking the original reasoning behind the Austin decision and relying 
on defending rationales which were never considered during Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce, preventing corruption and protecting stockholders. Furthermore, they 
argued that neither of these rationales are applicable to Citizens United, which did not 
corrupt anyone and clearly did not have any stockholders to protect. They claimed that 
the FEC had given up its challenge on the film in order to defend two prior decisions, 
Austin and McConnell, which Citizens United argued the FEC would use “to suppress 
political speech another day” (558 U.S. 310). 
 
Argument of the Defendant 
  
 The Federal Elections Commission, or FEC, served as the defendant in the case, 
arguing for the illegality of Citizens United’s attempts to air Hilary: The Movie. The FEC 
argued this case with Citizens United was not a proper one to reexamine Austin or 
McConnell because of “idiosyncratic features” which made it “particularly unsuitable” to 
                                               
8 Stare decisis is the doctrine of precedent in law. Courts can cite stare decisis when an issue, similar to the 
current case, has been brought to the court prior and a ruling was made. According to the Supreme 
Court, stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, 
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process.” By deferring to previous decisions, stare decisis keeps the Court from having to continuously 
evaluate legal underpinnings of past decisions and doctrines (LII Staff, 2017). 
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answer such a large Constitutional question. The FEC claimed that the question is mostly 
about for-profit corporations and businesses, and because Citizens United is a non-profit 
advocacy corporation, any decision should not be made based upon it. They stated that 
the Court should wait for a similar case to be brought forward by a for-profit corporation 
in order to redecide Austin and or McConnell. Essentially, the FEC was seemingly 
suggesting a pass for Citizens United in the case of Hilary: The Movie due to its status as 
a non-profit corporation.9 
 The FEC then focused its attention to the potential for corruption in its defense of 
the two precedents. The Solicitor General cautioned the Court that they would be 
discarding “decades of federal legislation” if they were to repeal either previous decision. 
Claiming that the Austin decision should not be treated as an aberration, the FEC 
furthered that repealing Austin would lead to corporate treasuries engaging in “actual 
corruption” of elections and politics. The FEC continually argued against the 
reexamination based on the potential corruption from for-profit businesses due to their 
“vast sums” of spending on politics. “The nature of business corporations,” the brief said, 
“makes corporate political activity inherently more likely than individual advocacy to 
cause quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such corruption.”  Even if this 
reasoning could not directly be applied to Citizens United, the FEC still argued that the 
Austin and McConnell decisions were still sound and should not be reexamined.  
                                               
9 The legal distinction between a non-profit advocacy group, such as Citizens United, and a for-profit 
enterprise is important in understanding the arguments and the Court’s decision. While a for-profit 
enterprise’s “primary mission is to generate profit,” non-profit advocacy groups do not prioritize profit but 
rather are dedicated to promoting a cause or advocating for a particular standpoint (“7 Key Differences…”, 
2019). This distinction matters further in campaign finance, as in terms of the potential for corruption, 
which is what both the Court and FEC are concerned with, a for-profit enterprise has much greater 
potential. Because its main goal is making a profit, this produces incentive for corruption by donating to a 
campaign and seeking monetary or other political favors from the candidate. While arguably non-profit 
advocacy groups also hold some potential for corruption, as they also could seek political favors after a 
contribution, there is seemingly less potential since their mission is not driven by money.  
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 In a separate reply brief to Citizens United arguments, the FEC furthered their 
argument that Citizens United had already forfeited its claims to a Constitutional 
challenge. They also argued more firmly against for-profit corporation political spending, 
repeatedly citing its potential for corruption in the political system. Lastly, the brief 
questioned Citizens United for trying to overrule Court decisions which did not 
necessarily apply to them when they could more easily win the case on narrower grounds, 
once again signaling the FEC’s objective of maintaining the Austin and McConnell 
decisions (558 U.S. 310). 
 
Majority Opinion 
 
Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion in which he reasoned for allowing 
unlimited independent expenditures by corporations. This was accomplished through 
overruling Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce in 1990. He explained that §441b of 
the FECA was only ever made legal because of the Austin ruling. However, he further 
noted that the rationale in the Austin decision was unconstitutional and did not follow the 
First Amendment precedents that had been set by the Court prior.10 It was the opinion of 
the Court that, “We agree with that conclusion and hold that stare decisis does not compel 
the continued acceptance of Austin. The Government may regulate corporate political 
speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that 
speech altogether” (558 U.S. 310, p. 1-2). An overrule of Austin deemed §441b of the 
FECA unconstitutional. Because the ruling in McConnell was largely based off the ruling 
                                               
10 Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation  
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in Austin, the Court’s decision also overruled portions of McConnell v Federal Election 
Commission upholding limits on electioneering communications.  
Before determining whether Austin should be overruled, Justice Kennedy first 
questions whether the application of §441b could be applied to Citizens United on 
narrower grounds. Citizens United claimed that it was inapplicable to Hillary: The Movie 
because the movie does not qualify as electioneering communications or as express 
advocacy because it is shown through video on demand, and therefore has a lower chance 
of distorting politics than a television ad. They also claim it does not meet the criteria 
since Citizens United is mostly funded by individuals. However, the Court cites 
reasoning against these claims by Citizens United, instead asserting that they are all 
narrow claims which are not plausible for the application of §441b in the future. “We 
decline to adopt an interpretation that requires intricate case-by-case interpretations to 
verify whether political speech is banned, especially if we are convinced that, in the end, 
this corporation has a constitutional right to speak on this subject” (558 U.S. 310, p. 12).  
Although the Court finds reason to disprove each of Citizens United’s original 
claims for not applying §441b to Hillary: The Movie, they do so largely in part to avoid 
their narrow scopes. They did not want to make a ruling which would set a precedent for 
similar cases to have to go through tedious individual court cases if they could make a 
broader ruling determining the ultimate constitutionality of §441b and the decision in 
Austin which allowed for the establishment of §441b. “Indeed, a court would be remiss in 
performing its duties were it to accept an unsound principle merely to avoid the necessity 
of making a broader ruling. Here, the lack of a valid basis for an alternative ruling 
requires full consideration of the continuing effect of the speech suppression upheld in 
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Austin” (558 U.S. 310, p. 12). The Court deems it their responsibility as an institution to 
investigate the reasoning behind the statute thoroughly in order to make a broad ruling.  
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy explains that, “the Court cannot resolve this case 
on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the 
meaning and purpose of the First Amendment” (558 U.S. 310, p. 12). This conclusion 
leads the court into questioning the facial validity of §441b itself. While the appellate 
court had ruled that Citizens United had waived its right to challenge Austin by 
dismissing count 5, the facial challenge to §441b, the Supreme Court disagreed. They 
argue that even if Citizens United could waive the facial challenge while preserving the 
as-applied challenge, it would not in any way prevent the Court from still reconsidering 
Austin or §441b’s facial validity. Next, the Court accepts Citizen’s United claim that the 
FEC has violated its First Amendment right to free speech, which the Court explains is 
not a new claim. They also argue for the review of §441b due to the lack of distinction 
between facial and as-applied challenges. “Citizens United has preserved its First 
Amendment challenge to §441b as applied to the facts of the case; and given all the 
circumstances, we cannot easily address that issue without assuming a premise- the 
permissibility of restricting corporate political speech- that is itself in doubt” (558 U.S. 
310, p. 14). Once again, this time through the explanation of why this case allows for the 
questioning of the facial validity of §441b, the Court asserts that this case is ultimately 
about the constitutionality of limiting or restricting corporations’ rights to free speech.  
Justice Kennedy gives one more line of reasoning for the challenge of the facial 
validity of §441b based on this case. “Any other course of decision would prolong the 
substantial, nation-wide chilling effect caused by §441b’s prohibitions on corporate 
expenditures” (558 U.S. 310, p. 16). He explains the uncertainty of the clause on behalf 
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of the Government in their interpretation of what constitutes both a nonprofit 
organization and an applicable form of media and in turn argues that not deciding the 
facial validity of §441b would further this uncertainty. Next, he argues that the timeliness 
of political speech makes a case-by-case application of the principle ineffective. “There 
are short time frames in which speech can have influence,” (558 U.S. 310, p. 17). 
Inevitably, Citizens United lost its time frame for political speech, as the case was being 
decided nearly two years after the presidential primary nomination it was seeking to 
influence. To question §441b as-applied would mean the window for influencing politics 
would already be closed by the time the decision was made, even if it was decided to 
allow the corporation to participate. Lastly, returning to what the Court cites as the main 
issue in this decision, Justice Kennedy explains that the importance of speech to election 
integrity makes the facial validity decision crucial. He goes on to explain the complexity 
and length of FEC legislation in all of its regulations, justifications, and exceptions. 
Justice Kennedy uses this to assert that any limits on speech interfere with the integrity of 
elections and with a free marketplace of ideas. He even refers to the FEC as a “regime” 
which is what he mandates “an unprecedented governmental intervention in the realm of 
speech” (558 U.S. 310, p. 19). This conclusion and the support for why this case renders 
the consideration of the facial validity of §441b both constitute the need to invoke earlier 
precedents set by the Court, which overrule any statute that chills speech.  
After establishing that the validity of §441b must be considered by the Court, 
Justice Kennedy begins the reasoning behind the Court’s decision of its validity. By 
giving examples of situations which are considered felonies under this section yet are 
simply corporations expressing their views publicly, he works to reason why the ban on 
corporate independent expenditures for express advocacy is a ban itself on freedom of 
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speech. He also considers PACs,11 citing the costly and weighty restrictions on both 
establishing and running them. While he admits that PACs allow for the funding of such 
action as Citizens United is attempting to take, he deems them an ineffective means of 
doing so. Furthermore, he established that a PAC does not actually allow for a 
corporation to speak through it, making them irrelevant to the discussion of their impact 
on freedom of speech. Because PACs do not alleviate the First Amendment burden put 
upon corporations by §441b, the Court determined that, “Section 441b’s prohibition on 
corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech” (558 U.S. 310, p. 22).  
 
Dissenting Opinion 
 
 Justice Stevens delivered the dissenting opinion, which was concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor concurred with Justice 
Stevens. Justice Stevens began the dissent by making it clear that this case is not about 
how Citizens United can finance their electioneering communications, but rather about if 
the First Amendment can affirmatively answer how Citizens United can do so. 
Furthermore, the idea that for-profit entities’ campaign finance law can be rewritten 
based off this case is “misguided.” Justice Stevens calls the “glittering generality” that the 
First Amendment calls for free speech for corporations as it does for individuals an 
incorrect statement of law. “The conceit that corporations must be treated identically to 
natural persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also inadequate to justify 
the Court’s disposition of this case” (558 U.S. 310). He furthers that the Court’s decision 
                                               
11 Super PACs were not in existence at the time of the decisions, thus making them irrelevant to this 
reasoning.  
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in way of handling corporate electioneering is a break from a century of history which 
has distinguished between individual contributions and corporate campaign spending.12 
Ultimately, the dissent agrees with the Court’s decision to uphold BCRA’s disclosure 
provisions but disagrees with its principal holding. 
 The dissent outlines why it believes the Court never should have decided whether 
to overrule Austin and portions of McConnell. Firstly, the Court asked the plaintiff and 
defendant whether Austin should be overruled rather than the questions of the case 
directly asking the Court, which is “unusual and inadvisable” for a court. The dissent 
claims that this review of Austin based on Citizens United was the work of five judges 
unhappy with the limited nature of the case. Next, the Court has historically considered 
facial challenges to be disfavored,13 yet they declared §203 facially unconstitutional, 
thereby turning an as-applied challenge into a facial challenge. One of the major grounds 
the majority opinion and Court stands on to require the review of Austin is that anything 
less or narrower would chill corporate speech. However, the dissent claims this 
“desertion is unsubstantiated” as there is no record for a significant number of 
corporations to have been chilled by FEC oversight.  
 Furthermore, the dissent critiques the Court’s overlook of stare decisis. “I am not 
an absolutist when it comes to stare decisis, in the campaign finance area or in any other. 
No one is. But if this principle is to do any meaningful work in supporting the rule of law, 
it must at least demand a significant justification, beyond the preferences of five Justices, 
for overturning settled doctrine” (558 U.S. 310). Justice Stevens claims that the Court 
only wanted to bypass stare decisis because of personal preference. He notes that the 
                                               
12 FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.; McConnell v. FEC; FEC v. Beaumont; FEC v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc.; California Medical Assn, v. FEC 
13 Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party; Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of 
Northern New Eng.  
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Austin decision has been on the book for two decades, while McConnell is only six years 
old, and the only thing that has changed since that decision is the makeup of the Court.  
 Next, the dissent outlines three disagreements it has with core premises the 
Court’s decision relied on. First, they disagree that there is any total ban on corporate 
speech. They embolden the multitude of additional avenues open for speech apart from 
some restrictions. Secondly, they disagree with the premise that the government cannot 
restrict political speech based on the speaker’s identity. While the majority rests this 
premise on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the dissent argues that this is a 
misunderstanding of that case, claiming that it was a much narrower ruling. The dissent 
furthers that the government can restrict political speech based on identity when that 
identity is understood in categorical or institutional terms. For example, the government 
limits the rights of speech by students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, 
foreigners, and its own employees. Lastly, the dissent disagrees with the majority’s 
premise that the Austin and McConnell decisions were radical outliers of the First 
Amendment tradition. In contrast, the dissent views the Citizens United decision as a 
radical departure from First Amendment law.  Furthermore, the dissent questions the 
rationales of anticorruption, anti-distortion, and shareholder protection rationales which 
the majority bases its ruling on. They argue that the anti-distortion rationale of Austin is 
itself an anticorruption rationale.   
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CHAPTER III- SPEECHNOW.ORG V FEC 
 
 While the ruling in Citizens United v FEC laid the foundation for Super PACs, 
they were formally created through the ruling of SpeechNOW.org v FEC, a case tried in 
the D.C. Circuit in 2010, just two months after the Citizens United decision. It was the 
first court case in which the decision in Citizens United, which removed contribution 
limits from independent expenditures, was applied. SpeechNOW is a nonprofit 
organization made up of individuals whom pool their resources to support candidates in 
elections through independent expenditures and with express advocacy. While 
SpeechNOW only accepts donations from individuals, and not corporations, under the 
FECA, they were required to register as a political committee upon raising $1,000 and 
also faced contribution limits. On February 14, 2008 (prior to the Citizens United 
decision), SpeechNOW and other individual plaintiffs14 filed a suit in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia which challenged these registration and 
disclosure requirements and contribution limitations by the FEC. The District Court then 
denied the request for a preliminary injunction, “holding that sufficiently important 
                                               
14 David Keating, Fred M. Young, Jr., Edward H. Crane III, Brad Russo, and Scott Burkhard. David 
Keating being both the president and treasurer of SpeechNOW. 
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government interests support limits on contributions to political committees, including 
groups like SpeechNOW who intend to spend all of their money on independent 
expenditures." However, the plaintiffs then appealed the case to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which made a ruling post- Citizens United 
(“SpeechNOW.org v. Federal Election Commission.”, 2019).  
 
Argument of the Plaintiff  
 
 The plaintiff, SpeechNOW, immediately links this case to the Citizens United 
decision by beginning the appeal with a reference to and application of the decision. “In 
Citizens United v. FEC, this Court held that the government cannot require a corporation 
to speak through a political committee or ‘PAC’ as an alternative to banning the 
corporation’s speech outright. In direct conflict with that holding, the D.C. Circuit held 
that SpeechNow.org - an unincorporated group that makes only independent expenditures 
and thus poses no risk of corruption or its appearance - must organize as a political 
committee in order to speak” (No. 08-5223, p. i). In acknowledging Citizens United as its 
grounds for appeal, SpeechNOW further mimics the language used by the majority in 
Citizens United as it summarizes what it sees as the root of the case. “The question 
presented is whether, under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, the federal 
government may require an unincorporated association that makes only independent 
expenditures to register and report as a political committee despite the fact that a more 
narrowly tailored means of disclosing its independent expenditures exists in 2 U.S.C. § 
434(c)” (No. 08-5223, p. i). If the Court had just ruled that “burdensome PAC 
requirements” did not hold for corporations, then SpeechNOW believed the same should 
be applicable for them, regardless of their unincorporated status. 
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 First, SpeechNOW argues that the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision conflicts with the 
Supreme Court’s in Citizens United in that a group of citizens must associate as a PAC in 
order to make unlimited independent expenditures. Citing a majority opinion quote from 
Citizens United and other court cases,15 they argue that the Court has historically 
recognized the burdens PACs impose on those that spend money as a form of speech. In 
Citizens United, these burdens led the Court to decide that the independent expenditure 
restrictions were a violation of free speech. SpeechNOW argues that the same logic 
should be applied to them because while the restrictions and statutory provisions are not 
the same for Citizens United and SpeechNOW, the results are the same. “SpeechNow.org 
is prohibited from making unlimited independent expenditures unless it becomes a PAC” 
(No. 08-5223, p. 15). They use this reasoning to argue that the results of registering and 
maintaining the status of a PAC are as burdensome as the limitations on Citizens United, 
as thus should also be considered a violation of the right to free speech.  
 Next, SpeechNOW argues that the D.C. Circuit failed to apply strict scrutiny16 to 
the requirements of PACs and thus misapplied immediate scrutiny.17 The majority 
opinion in Citizens United quoted FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. in that it is a First 
Amendment law that, “laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict scrutiny,’ 
which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling 
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest’” (No. 08-5223, p. 21). 
SpeechNOW utilizes this same reasoning in order to assert that SpeechNOW’s 
                                               
15 FEC v Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.; FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
16 Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review in which courts determine the constitutionality of laws. In 
order to pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to further a “compelling government 
interest” and have thus narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest. Strict scrutiny is the highest 
standard of review to evaluate constitutionality (Strasser, 2018).  
17 Immediate scrutiny is another form of judicial review in which courts determine the constitutionality of 
laws. It is invoked when a statue negatively affects protected classes. In order to pass immediate scrutiny, 
the law must further an important government interest and do so by means substantially related to that 
interest. It is therefore less rigorous than strict scrutiny (Hashmall, 2017). 
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independent expenditures hold no threat for corruption, and thus SpeechNOW’s PAC 
requirements should be overthrown as the requirements upon Citizens United were. The 
plaintiff’s argument relies on this direct correlation between SpeechNOW and Citizens 
United as entities, explaining, “this case is therefore on all fours with Citizens United and 
the outcome should be the same” (No. 08-5223, p. 21). By choosing to address PAC 
requirements as they applied to SpeechNOW and treat them as minor disclosure 
requirements rather than “inherently burdensome speech restrictions”, SpeechNOW 
argues that the D.C. Circuit Court failed to apply strict scrutiny to the PAC requirements 
and furthermore failed to apply immediate scrutiny. “Both Davis and Citizens United 
support the principle that disclosure laws must be narrowly tailored to fit their legitimate 
ends… Moreover, everything the D.C. Circuit claimed as a justification for requiring 
SpeechNow.org to become a PAC- for example, that SpeechNow.org could allegedly 
avoid reporting contributions made exclusively for administrative expenses and that 
requiring SpeechNow.org to become a PAC would facilitate the detection of violations of 
other laws - could just as easily be said about Citizens United or any MCFL group. Yet in 
both cases, this Court refused to require such groups to become PACs” (No. 08-5223, p. 
24). SpeechNOW furthers that the same could be said regarding strict and immediate 
scrutiny to Buckley and McConnell.  
 SpeechNOW next argues that the case raises issues of national significance about 
the scope of regulations groups making independent expenditures should face. They 
argue that the D.C. Circuit disregarded the importance of political speech which results in 
unincorporated associations like SpeechNOW facing greater burdens in making 
independent expenditures than corporations or unions do. “Citizens United stands not 
only for the proposition that the government may not ban certain speakers from making 
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independent expenditures, but also that it may not so burden independent political speech 
that speakers will avoid the effort altogether” (No. 08-5223, p. 26). Following the same 
language in the Citizens United decision that corporations’ political speech would be 
chilled, SpeechNOW argues that the independent speech of groups like their own will 
also be chilled by having to register as and meet the restrictions of a PAC.  
 SpeechNOW concludes its argument by claiming that its case allows the court to 
finally clarify the scope and application of the “Major Purpose” test. The “Major 
Purpose” test comes from the FEC, in which they allow groups to become PACs as long 
as their “major purpose” is “federal campaign activity.” While SpeechNOW agrees that 
making independent expenditures is their major purpose, they dispute the idea that it 
justifies their requirement to register as a PAC. Since corporations and unions are 
allowed unlimited independent expenditures without registering as PACs under the 
Citizens United ruling, SpeechNOW argues that the government cannot justify it having 
to do so. They argue that a threat of corruption- which SpeechNOW does not hold- is a 
better interpretation of the “Major Purpose” test, which determines whether a group must 
register as a PAC in order to speak. With the introduction of unlimited political speech by 
corporations and unions, SpeechNOW questions whether corporations and unions could 
pass the “Major Purpose” test and should therefore be required to register as PACs. 
“Resolving the question presented in this case in SpeechNow.org’s favor would bring 
clarity to the law and would preserve free speech by making clear that only groups whose 
activities pose a threat of corruption need register as PACs” (No. 08-5223, p. 31). In 
conclusion, SpeechNOW reiterates that the court has the opportunity to clarify for groups 
such as itself that they do not have to undergo the burdensome process of registering as a 
PAC and maintaining the regulations of one in order to speak.  
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Argument of the Defendant  
 
In opposition, the Federal Elections Commission asserts that the Court of Appeals 
correctly rejected SpeechNOW’s as-applied challenge to the FECA. They also assert that 
this decision did not conflict with any other court’s decision, signaling they clearly do not 
agree with SpeechNOW’s core assumption that they should be treated in the same respect 
as Citizens United. The FEC points out that unlike Citizens United prior to its ruling, 
SpeechNOW is already permitted to spend unlimited amounts on independent 
expenditures, granted they register and comply with PAC requirements. They argue that 
the question raised by SpeechNOW’s case is not whether there should be different PAC 
or disclosure requirements for corporate and unincorporated entities, but rather whether 
the Constitution permits PAC registration, compliance, and disclosure requirements of all 
entities.  
 The FEC rejects SpeechNOW’s claims that the court failed to apply strict or 
immediate scrutiny. They argue that the court applied the same scrutiny that it has used in 
the past, from Buckley to Citizens United. “Because the FECA provisions that petitioners 
challenge in this Court do not limit SpeechNow’s ability to raise or spend funds to speak 
as it sees fit, but require only that SpeechNow disclose the origins and destination of 
those funds (and take accompanying administrative steps), the court of appeals properly 
applied this Court’s intermediate ‘exacting scrutiny’ standard rather than the strict 
scrutiny applicable to speech prohibitions” (No. 08-5223, p. 11). They further that strict 
scrutiny never should have been applied in this case, as the disclosure requirements in 
this case are not comparable to the spending limits in Citizens United. Unlike 
SpeechNOW, which argued that PAC requirements are burdensome to free speech, the 
FEC asserts that requiring SpeechNOW to register as a PAC does not inhibit its ability to 
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participate in campaign advocacy. The FEC even remarks that David Keating, as the 
treasurer of SpeechNOW, is fully capable of handling the responsibilities of reporting 
due to his history of political activism and support for other PACs. “As the court of 
appeals concluded, the organizational requirements that petitioners challenge, such as 
designating a treasurer and retaining records, do not ‘impose much of an additional 
burden upon SpeechNow,’, especially given the relative simplicity with which 
SpeechNow intends to operate” (No. 08-5223, p. 20). 
 Although SpeechNOW did not object to the disclosure requirements of a PAC, if 
they were required to register as one, the FEC includes a thorough argument in support of 
these requirements in its defense.18 First, the disclosure requirements inform the 
electorate of who is funding the candidate, which both defines the candidate’s 
constituencies and show which interests the candidate will likely respond to. “…In 
Citizens United, the Court held that ‘the informational interest alone is sufficient’ to 
sustain a requirement to disclose ‘who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an 
election’” (No. 08-5223, p. 14). Secondly, the reporting serves in ensuring campaign 
finance restrictions are not being violated, and possibly deters some from violating them. 
This assertion was also upheld in Buckley and McConnell.  
 Regarding SpeechNOW’s assertion that the PAC requirement would chill future 
political speech, similar to the argument of Citizens United, the FEC disagrees and claims 
that the “political science article” used by the plaintiff is incorrect in justifying so.19 They 
                                               
18 These arguments are crucial in understanding why a Super PAC is still under some disclosure 
regulations. 
19 The article, Why is there so Little Money in American Politics?, claims that PACs spend more than half 
of their total revenue on compliance costs and fundraising. The article does not indicate which percentage 
is attributable to fundraising and does not distinguish what exact percent is attributable solely to reporting. 
The FEC cites a recent study of political-committees of Fortune 100 companies which claims that reporting 
and compliance only accounts for 15% of PAC time on average, and that 80% of PACs surveyed had 2 or 
fewer employees (No. 08-5223, p. 21). 
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also disagree with SpeechNOW’s assertion that the “Major Purpose” test should be 
abandoned or clarified, as the petitioners never asserted that SpeechNOW would not pass 
the test, making it irrelevant in the case. “In any event, because making independent 
expenditures appears to be SpeechNow’s sole purpose, whatever difficulties of 
administration the ‘major purpose’ test might cause in its application to other 
organizations are not present here” (No. 08-5223, p. 25). They also further that 
SpeechNOW gave no example of an organization which currently passes the “Major 
Purpose” test that should not.  
Decision  
 
 The opinion for the court was written by Chief Judge David B. Sentelle. The court 
immediately points to Citizens United in its decision, even counter-arguing FEC 
arguments from Citizens United. Ultimately, the court decides that the contribution limits 
on SpeechNOW are unconstitutional, but the reporting and organizational requirements 
are constitutional, birthing the Super PAC. They state that courts may only trump First 
Amendment rights when a countervailing interest outweighs the limit’s burden on 
exercising those rights. Specifically, the Supreme Court has only regarded preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption as doing so. In this case of expenditure limits 
on SpeechNOW, the court ruled that there is no anticorruption interest. “Because of the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC, the analysis is 
straightforward. There, the Court held that the government has no anti-corruption interest 
in limiting independent expenditures” (No. 08-5223). This, of course, hinges on 
SpeechNOW only participating in independent expenditures, as with Citizens United. 
The court clarifies that SpeechNOW may both make and accept unlimited contributions 
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only because they are independent expenditures and that direct contributions to 
candidates are not affected by this ruling. In a more muted tone than in the Citizens 
United decision, however, the court notes, “We do not need to answer whether giving 
money is speech per se, or if contributions are merely symbolic expressions of general 
support” (No. 08-5223).  
 Regarding organization and disclosure requirements, the court rules that they are 
not sufficient to impend First Amendment rights. In referencing Buckley, McConnell, and 
Citizens United, “Because disclosure requirements inhibit speech less than do 
contribution and expenditure limits, the Supreme Court has not limited the government's 
acceptable interests to anti-corruption alone. Instead, the government may point to any 
‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest that bears a substantial relation’ to the 
disclosure requirement. Indeed, the Court has approvingly noted that ‘disclosure is a less 
restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech’” (No. 08-5223). The 
court blatantly disagrees with SpeechNOW’s argument that the organizational and 
reporting requirements of a PAC are too burdensome on freedom of speech. They argue 
that the difference in the reporting requirements already established on SpeechNOW as a 
group which makes independent expenditures and the reporting requirements of a PAC is 
minimal. The court also agrees with the defendant, the FEC’s, argument that the public 
has an interest in knowing who is funding the speech about a candidate, whether it be 
administrative costs or independent expenditures. Further, they agree that this disclosure 
deters and helps to expose campaign finance restriction violations.  
 
 
 
 43 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV- SUPER PACS BY THE NUMBERS 
20 
 When considering the impact Super PACs have had on campaign finance and on 
the overall federal election system, there are multiple measures to interpret. In both 
Citizens United and SpeechNow, the plaintiffs and the Courts asserted that expenditure 
limitations on corporations and PACs chill political speech. This graph represents the 
                                               
20 “Cost of Election,” 2019. 
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total amount spent on federal elections, both Congressional (blue) and Presidential 
(orange) by year. This spending includes direct contributions as well as independent 
interest group spending, including that of Super PACs. There is not a dramatic increase in 
spending following 2010, when Super PAC independent expenditures became legal. 
However, it is important to note that campaign spending was already increasing most 
every year prior to the Citizens United decision, meaning that the introduction of Super 
PACs is not solely responsible for any increases in total election costs after 2012. These 
data can modestly help support the claim that expenditure limits, which were in effect 
prior to 2012, chill political speech, as once the limits were lifted upon the introduction of 
Super PACs, there are increases in overall campaign spending, or political speech.  
 45 
21 
 This graph shows the total outside spending, minus contributions from political 
parties, from 2000-2018. Notably, there is a major increase from 2002 to 2004. 2004 was 
the first election cycle in which electioneering communications were utilized as 
independent expenditures. An even bigger increase occurs between 2010 and 2012, 
specifically from the birth of Super PACs. In one election cycle alone, Super PACs over 
tripled the amount spent on independent expenditures. This can also be used to support 
the assertion by the courts and plaintiffs in Citizens United and SpeechNow that 
independent expenditure limitations chilled political speech. Clearly, corporations and 
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organizations which formed Super PACs were not participating as fully in the political 
process prior to being able to participate limitlessly as Super PACs. This also represents 
the impact Super PACs have today on the political process. Prior to Super PACs, less 
than a third was being spent on campaign independent expenditures than is spent today, 
making it clear that Super PACs have become an integral component of modern-day 
elections and that their impact is important.  
22 
 More specifically, this graph shows the total outside spending of each election 
cycle post-Citizens United. It breaks down the total outside spending by type, separated 
into political parties, social welfare groups, unions, Super PACs, trade associations, and 
other. Super PACs account for the majority of outside spending in each election cycle. 
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Total outside spending is higher in 2012 and 2016 as both are presidential election cycles. 
As Super PACs were non-existent before the 2012 election cycle, this demonstrates how 
much of an impact they had on both how much outside spending occurred and how the 
outside spending was funded.  It also shows that other participants in independent 
expenditures have not just funneled their donations into Super PACs and away from how 
they used to donate. All the other categories have remained somewhat consistent, if not 
increased, even with the introduction of Super PACs.  
23 
 When considering total PAC spending in federal campaigns since 2000, it is once 
again clear how the Citizens United decision impacted PAC spending. With the 
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introduction of Super PACS to campaign finance in the 2012 election cycle, total PAC 
spending increased by 235.43% in one cycle. Between 2010 and 2018, the last election 
cycle without Super PACs and the most recent election cycle with Super PACs, total 
PAC spending increased by 247.34%. Between 2010 and 2016, the last election cycle 
without Super PACs and the election cycle with the highest PAC spending, overall PAC 
spending increased by 357.49%. Each presidential cycle has considerably higher total 
spending, as it accounts for more elections that in a non-presidential election year, which 
only has Congressional campaign spending. While this chart does not distinguish 
between regular PAC spending and Super PAC spending, the sharp increases in PAC 
spending immediately following Citizens United show that Super PAC spending accounts 
for a vast majority of the increased overall PAC spending.24  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
24 All graphs in this chapter use the time frame of 2000-2018, when the data are available. 2000 is chosen 
as the starting point, as that was the election cycle when independent expenditures, especially in the form of 
media advertisements, became more popular, and it represents the last two decades of campaign finance. 
2018 is the most recent election cycle for which complete data is available. 2012 was the first election cycle 
after Citizens United, meaning it was the first election cycle in which Super PACs were active. Some 
graphs only use 2012-2018 for the timeline as they are specifically about Super PACs, so there are no 
Super PAC data available prior to 2012. 
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CHAPTER V- CONCLUSION 
Campaign finance as an issue which deems federal intervention has been 
prominent since the days of the first president of the United States. Early campaign 
finance focused on specific legislation which limited types of donors or types of 
donations in order to ensure more equality and accessibility in elections. However, much 
of this early campaign finance legislation and subsequent court cases was not highly 
enforced. It was not until 1967 that Congress took a greater stake in enforcing its 
campaign finance legislation through actually collecting campaign finance reports. The 
modern era of campaign finance law is a culmination of court cases and legislation which 
all cover varying views on the effects of campaign finance and on the rights of its donors. 
The Federal Elections Campaign Acts of 1971, and its 1974 amendment, ushered 
in this modern era of campaign finance by legislating a governing body over federal 
campaign finance regulation, the FEC, and by creating a comprehensive set of legislation 
regarding the levying and spending of campaign funds. A challenge to the 
constitutionality of the FECA in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976 found portions of the FECA to 
be unconstitutional as it set the precedent for regarding campaign finance as a form of 
free speech protected by the Constitution. Most importantly, the case struck down limits 
on campaign expenditures, limits on independent spending, and limits on expenditures of 
 50 
candidates’ personal funds, while upholding limits on contributions. Thirteen years later, 
in 1989, a prominent campaign finance scandal once again brought campaign finance to 
national attention and called for more reform. In the Keating Five Scandal, five senators 
were accused of accepting large donations from the owner of a bank impending failure 
and for unethically interfering with its closure. Senator John McCain, who was indicted 
in the case but not found guilty, sought to personally reform campaign finance to remove 
the scandal from his political legacy. In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 
better known as BCRA or the McCain-Feingold Act, was passed as a major amendment 
to the FECA. The BCRA sought to close the loophole of soft money in campaigns. 
Namely, it raised the limit on contributions by individuals and banned federal candidates 
or their parties from soliciting, receiving, or directing money from any person or 
organization not following the FECA guidelines and prohibited the use of electioneering 
communications by corporations or trade unions. Both of these major reforms were 
upheld by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC in 2003.  
Most prominently, and most importantly in this work, Super PACs have become 
the essence of today’s campaign finance law. On January 10, 2010, the ruling in Citizens 
United v FEC paved the way for the creation of Super PACs. Citizens United, a nonprofit 
company, had planned to televise its film, Hillary: The Movie, for all viewers on video on 
demand and to advertise for the film with commercials. However, as the film was 
specifically about a candidate, Hillary Clinton, and would be accessible within 30 days of 
a federal election using electioneering communications from a corporate treasury, 
showing the film would be a felony under the FECA. Citizens United questioned the 
constitutionality of this law, eventually leaving it to the Supreme Court to determine 
whether the FECA limits the group’s First Amendment right to free speech. The case 
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ultimately became about whether the decisions made in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce and McConnell v. FEC were applicable to a nonprofit group such as Citizens 
United in the case of campaign finance. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion 
in a 5-4 decision in favor of Citizens United. The court ruled that §441b of the FECA, 
making the funding of the film a felony, was only ever legitimate because of the Austin 
decision, but that the Austin decision was unconstitutional and did not follow prior court 
precedent. This overrule of Austin also overruled portions of McConnell v. FEC, 
specifically those which put limits on electioneering communications. The ruling in favor 
of Citizens United overturned any limits on independent expenditures by corporations, 
legalizing one of the major components of a Super PAC.  
However, Super PACs were not officially legal until the decision in 
SpeechNOW.org v FEC on March 26, 2010, just months after the Citizens United 
decision. SpeechNOW, a nonprofit organization, filed a suit in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia in February of 2008 regarding the legislation requiring them to 
register as a PAC. While SpeechNOW only accepts donations from individuals, and not 
corporations, under the FECA, they were required to register as a political action 
committee upon raising $1,000 and faced contribution limits as such. The District Court 
denied the request for a preliminary injunction, but SpeechNOW appealed to the Court of 
Appeals, which then made a decision in the case following the Citizens United decision. 
The court made its decision following stare decisis of Citizens United. They ruled that 
any contribution limits on SpeechNOW are unconstitutional, as they limit free speech and 
chill political speech of corporations, but that reporting and organizational requirements 
of a PAC are constitutional, as they are not burdensome enough to limit free speech.  
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The combination of the Citizens United and SpeechNow.org decisions created the 
Super PAC, an unlimited independent expenditure only political action committee. By 
legalizing unlimited independent expenditures for both corporations and organizations 
which register and comply with regulations of PACs, the two court decisions morphed 
into an organization which allows unlimited independent expenditures. Super PACs 
quickly entered the arena of federal campaign finance, becoming a major component of 
both total spending and outside spending in 2012, the first cycle in which they were legal. 
The data regarding Super PACs’ influence on federal elections strictly in contribution 
amounts from 2012 to present day elections credits it as a massive influence. To go from 
having no direct place in campaign finance to amounting to over 60% of total outside 
spending in federal elections in less than six years, the impact and influence of Super 
PACs on campaigns cannot be understated.  
While many, usually on the right, such as Justice Kennedy, would consider this 
influence by Super PACs as a win for free speech by allowing corporations to fulfill their 
practice of unlimited donations, others, usually on the left, consider the intense growth of 
Super PACs to be a dangerous gateway for more dark money and influences to enter 
politics and government. As candidates enter the Democratic primary for the 2020 
presidential election, many have vowed to not accept any large money donations or 
donations from PACs or Super PACs in order to stand by their disapproval of big or dark 
money in politics. However, when it comes to Super PACs, candidates have no say in if 
they are funded by them or not. Because Super PACs can only participate in elections 
through independent expenditures, they can never have direct contact with a candidate or 
his or her campaign team. Whether or not a candidate wants to be associated with a Super 
PAC is ultimately not up to them. For example, candidate Cory Booker has rejected any 
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money from corporate PACs and has publicly vowed to not accept any big money 
contributions, but a wealthy Democratic donor has launched a Super PAC in support of 
Booker (Robillard, 2019). 
Even if Democratic candidates could successfully keep Super PACs from forming 
and working in favor of their campaigns, could they have any success in the election 
without such big money donations? With Super PACs making up a majority of spending 
in elections, to completely rule them out would mean a major disadvantage for the 
candidate in terms of amount spent. In an increasingly media-driven world, these 
donations have an even greater impact. As Super PACs typically use independent 
expenditures to promote the candidate or oppose its competition specifically in the media, 
efforts by Super PACs are some of the most influential parts of the campaign in terms of 
the public. If a Democratic candidate were to free his or herself from any Super PAC 
endorsements while the Republican candidate reaped the benefits of Super PAC 
endorsements, it would undoubtedly have a negative effect on the Democratic nominee. 
While these candidates are disavowing Super PAC money in order to take an ideological 
stance against it, it greatly hinders their ability to be elected to the position in which they 
could actually work to reform campaign finance.  
Despite claims and platforms of many candidates promising to erode campaign 
finance of dark money or big donors, there is no way to completely eradicate money from 
politics without turning to publicly funded campaigns, a concept inconceivable to many 
in the reality of American ideologies. However, in 2016, the state of California passed 
Senate Bill 1107, which would pave the way for its state and local governments to 
establish public financing programs for candidates running in state and local elections. 
The bill was overruled by a court decision in which the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers 
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Association challenged SB 1107. The lower court ruled that the bill was improperly 
applied to the Political Reform Act of 1974, California’s major piece of campaign finance 
reform legislation post-Watergate, as it did not further the act’s purpose (Berger, 2019). 
This is just one example of the possibility of public financing entering American politics, 
but it clearly would have a long way to go to ever become the reality for all federal 
elections, ridding them of outside funding. But even with public funding, would Super 
PACs immediately be made illegal? As they are outside spending and have no 
communication with the candidate and his or her campaign team, they could be viewed 
separately from the public funding, potentially still leaving a loophole many are trying to 
close in campaign finance. 
Beyond the question of whether candidates can or should be supported by outside, 
dark sources, the question of anonymity is a major concern for Super PACs. Earlier, 
when discussing the different arguments for and against the anonymity of donors to 
Super PACs, the question was left of whether or not the anonymity or public 
transparency of political campaign donors actually matters to a democracy. When 
considering the question solely in terms of Super PACs, it has a give or take answer. The 
data regarding campaign finance both before and after the legality of Super PACs make it 
evident that there is increased political participation due to Super PACs, which is 
increased democracy, as more voices are allowed to be heard and to be heard louder in 
the political system. However, this comes with the take to consider that now more than 
ever, the American people have no public knowledge of who is participating in the 
political system, decreasing transparency and accessibility, and therefore democracy 
itself. There is no clear answer to whether Super PACs are a good thing for democracy, 
but there is a clear answer that Super PACs have immense, and increasing, influence over 
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campaigns, and therefore over the political system. In order to accept the increased 
political voice Super PACs allow individuals and corporations to have, one must be 
comfortable with not knowing who those donors are and where their intentions lie in 
making such donations.  
In the months following the Citizens United decision, the Brennan Center for 
Justice at the New York University School of Law conducted a survey to gauge public 
response to the decision. Sixty-nine percent of respondents answered that “new rules that 
let corporations, unions and people give unlimited money to Super PACs will lead to 
corruption,” with 74% of Republicans and 73% of Democrats agreeing to the statement. 
73% of respondents also agreed that “there would be less corruption if there were limits 
on how much money could be given to Super PACs.” More than three-quarters of all 
respondents agreed that members of Congress are “more likely to act in the interest of a 
group that spent millions to elect them than to act in the public interest” and two in three 
Americans said they “trust government less because big donors to Super PACs have more 
influence than regular voters” (Brennan Center for Justice, 2012). Six years later, in 
2018, after Super PACs had been active in multiple election cycles, Pew Research Center 
conducted a similar survey. 77% of respondents supported “limits on the amount of 
money individuals and organizations can spend on political campaigns and issues.” 
Similarly, nearly two thirds said that new laws could be “effective in reducing the role of 
money in politics” (“The Public, The Political System…”, 2019). These surveys suggest 
a more bipartisan opposition to Super PACs and their role in bringing dark money into 
politics.  
Making the question over anonymity and democracy even more complex, one 
must not forget that Super PACs are completely independent of the candidates they 
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support or oppose, meaning they are not acting in collaboration with the candidate or 
their team and thus cannot and should not be influencing the candidate’s political actions. 
The fact that Super PACs can only make independent expenditures is what makes them 
legal, as they are supporting a corporation or individual’s freedom of speech. Super PACs 
are acting on their own accord whenever they make decisions in how to publicly support 
or oppose a candidate. Candidates are not making their platform or political decisions in 
order to garner donations from anonymous Super PAC donors, because they legally and 
strictly cannot interact with such donors. Although Super PACs allow increased political 
participation by some, they are not equalizing political participation for all. Super PACs 
favor those with money and those able to organize their money for a specific interest. 
Because of this, Super PACs are unsustainable in a democracy. As explained previously, 
they put candidates at greater advantages and disadvantages than others, regardless of 
what decisions the candidates may make. Direct interaction between the candidate and a 
Super PAC is in conflict with their legality, but their lack of direct interaction is also 
what makes Super PACs unsustainable. Without the ability to control a Super PAC’s 
moves or motives, or without the ability to decide if one even wants to be supported by a 
Super PAC, Super PACs can easily be useless, if not harmful, to the candidates they are 
alleging to support.  
Despite the refutable evidence that Super PACs are playing an increased role and 
having an increased influence in federal elections, public opinion surveys have made it 
clear the American majority is against the role dark money is playing in politics today. In 
order to maintain a democracy in which each American can have their voice heard 
equally and can experience as equal of political participation as possible, unlimited and 
anonymous donations cannot be such an integral component of all federal elections. 
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When the voices of corporations are overpowering the voices of Americans themselves, 
as is seen by the percentage of Super PAC donations in recent election cycles, the 
corporation’s right to speech becomes more important than the individual’s right to 
speech. However, it is the individual who gets to elect their representative, and thus it 
should be the individual who gets the opportunity to participate in influencing elections. 
Super PACs fail to protect the interests of voters by turning elections into a monetary 
contest of which candidate can raise the most money from nameless and unknown 
corporations and wealthy individuals. Equating political participation for all Americans 
should be a primary goal in a democracy but is one which Super PACs fail to meet.  
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